That's one concern I get from these details:
We're working over the numbers we got from the JCP, which is great for hard and real values. But those numbers also reflect a situation where individuals' contributions were very low, and the environment was considered very "hostile" to them (well, hostile isn't the correct word, but I can't think of a better one right now... Counter-productive, maybe?).
Wasn't one of the points of the new Jakarta EE going to be to drive the community participation up?
If the whole thing is designed for having only a handful or two of individuals interacting, we'll obviously never have more than a couple of handfuls of individuals.
I followed the JCP processes for years, and joined as a member about a year and a half ago. And yet, I never contributed a single line of code, since I didn't find anything I could chip in with a worthwhile input.
With the new process of building projects from scratch, following FOSS tenets, and then standardizing/aggregating them to the umbrella project as they mature, I thought the idea was for all of us fence-sitters to be able to actively join in the advancement of Jakarta EE.
My fear is that, from all the comments explaining the current charter, I get the vibe of "things worked ok when we did things this way in the JCP, we're just removing Oracle from the throne".
And I thought the point was that Oracle having supreme powers was not the only issue we had with the JCP.
As I said before (many times), I perfectly agree that the members that pay a fee and add a half dozen contributors to the project have the right to more power than a single (or a handful of) individual contributor. I find that to be both fair and conductive to a project's advancement.
But just having a promise of one seat minimum, and maybe more if things go well, is not enough.
I can perfectly agree with something similar to Guillermo's percentage idea. I still consider 10% to be a very low ratio, but I can agree that 20% is too big if we follow the idea to a higher number.
We're also forgetting that all these power-shift details do affect everybody else.
Right now, strategic members get one seat each, while everybody else just elects a minimum of 1 to 2 seats (with the hopeful promise of more seats if needed).
We're also forgetting that, for the three non-committer elected seats, strategic members still have a chance of getting a second (or more) seats.
All the numbers, together, skewe the power too much to one side.
For example, if you remove strategic members from any eligible seat (since they already get one just from being strategic members), you'd leave the influencer seats to enterprise members, and participant seats to enterprise and solutions members.
That way, you'd ensure at least 4 seats to be in the hands on non-strategic members.
To expand on Guillermo's numbers, how about we assign a percentage of the seats to each non-strategic membership category?
That would mean something like (feel free to adjust numbers):
- Strategic Members: 1 seat each (for a total of 45% of the seats)
- Influencers: 25% of the seats, to a minimum of 2
- Participants: 15% of the seats, to a minimum of 1
- Committers: 15% of the seats, to a minimum of 1
To follow on your 4 strategic members projection (I was working with the assumption of 6, so we're close there):
- 4 Strategic Member seats
- 2 Influencer Member seats (25% = 2.2)
- 1 Participant Member seat (15% = 1.3)
- 1 Committer Member seat (15% = 1.3)
If we expand to 6 strategic members:
- 6 Strategic Member seats
- 3 Influencer Member seat (20% = 3.3)
- 2 Participant Member seat (15% = 2.0)
- 2 Committer Member seat (15% = 2.0)
These percentages would follow the original charter numbers (if we started from the assumption we'd have around 4 strategic members), but scale up as we get more strategic members.