https://bugs.eclipse.org/bugs/show_bug.cgi?id=351611 
     
    On 09/14/2011 10:18 AM, David Carver wrote:
    
      
      So this brings up a question...when was the last time Hudson
      itself was upgraded?  Do we have all the latest security patches,
      and fixes that have gone on in the latest code? 
       
      One of the first things that should occur is to make sure we have
      the latest versions stable versions of everything installed. 
      Start using Hudson 2.0. 
       
      Dave 
       
       
      On 09/13/2011 03:28 PM, Denis Roy wrote:
      
        
        While we're in a security-conscious frame-of-mind... 
         
         
        Many projects allow the Hudson user account to write to their
        download directories.  Projects use one of these two ways to do
        this: 
         
        1. They add an ACL on their download directory that allows the
        Hudson Build user to write there. 
         
        2. They chmod 777 their downloads directory, thus allowing
        everyone full access to their downloads directory. 
         
         
        Most of you understand that #2 is a clear violation of any kind
        of security we hope to maintain here at Eclipse.  Don't do
          it.  Please ask us for alternatives. 
         
         
        While #1 may seem like a better option, it has implications. 
        Allowing Hudson to alter downloads means that other committers
        can alter your downloads via a Hudson job.  I am not worried
        about this since I trust our committers. 
         
        The issue is about trusting a public-facing application
        (Hudson)  and all its plugins, each of which may contain
        security vulnerabilities.  If unauthorized control of Hudson was
        achieved, downloads could be replaced with compromised ZIP and
        JAR files. 
         
        As Hudson can sign on behalf of the Eclipse Foundation,
        compromised downloads would appear authentic with digital
        signatures and valid checksums.  A keystroke logger could leak
        sensitive credentials to a third party.  This is how
        unauthorized root access begins.  Far-fetched?  Not at all. 
         
        The above is not a stab at Hudson, Winstone or any other
        specific software -- all software may contain a vulnerability,
        including the Apache webserver and the Linux Kernel. 
         
        Hence, I strongly recommend you use a promotion job on
        build.eclipse.org which publishes known-good content from
        Hudson. A simple script which reads a state from Hudson, runs
        some sanity checks and wget's files and saves them in the
        downloads directory is a great start. 
         
         
        I appreciate your taking the time to read this.  My goal is not
        to encumber you with senseless, counter-productive dogma, but to
        strike a balance between security and convenience... with a
        slight bias towards security  :-) 
         
        Denis 
        
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