We track IP networks per user; however, once a
network is trusted by someone, it is trusted for all.
On 09/28/2011 12:13 PM, Igor Fedorenko wrote:
Out
of curiosity, do you track trusted ip networks per user or
independently from any user?
--
Regards,
Igor
On 11-09-28 10:56 AM, Denis Roy wrote:
Now that some of the dust has settled on
the recent security issues, I
thought it might be good to provide a bit more insight into what
your
evil webmasters have done, and what they have planned, in an
effort to
maintain high levels of security.
*What are you so afraid of?*
My biggest fear is that someone obtains root access on our
servers,
potentially exposing our binary downloads, source code, code
signing
certificate, SSL certificates, private information of
committers, users
and member organizations, and more.
*_Why strip everyone's shell access?_
*Local shell access is the easiest way to install software that
exploits
vulnerabilities to obtain root access. Although we trust our
committers,
active shell access is, and has always been, our biggest cause
for concern.
*
_Why restrict the shell to build.eclipse.org and not
dev.eclipse.org?_*
dev|git.eclipse.org run a patched kernel to support the large
number of
groups that many committers belong to, whereas build.eclipse.org
uses
the Novell-shipped kernel, making it easier and faster to deploy
a new
kernel on build.
*
_But I use keys to log in, isn't that safe?_
*Your private key is stored in a file in a standard location on
your
computer, and is available to any piece of software (and
malware) that
is running as your user account. If someone obtains a
committer's
private key, they can log in to our servers unchallenged and
undetected,
where they may have full shell access for weeks, months or
years.
*
_So how will you keep our Shell-Enabled accounts safe from key
(or
password) theft?_
*A simple mechanism is now tracking the IP networks from which
shell
accounts are used on build.eclipse.org. Soon, when we're
confident it
has sufficiently learned your login patterns, that mechanism
will
*block* a successful login from an unknown network.**An email
will be
sent out to you, and the simple act of responding to that email
will
place the unknown network in the trusted list for all.
If the trusted network is not used by anyone for more than two
months,
it is no longer trusted.
This mechanism only applies to committers with *full shell
access*
logging into *build.eclipse.org only*. SCM operations occurring
on
dev|git.eclipse.org will not be subjected to this scrutiny since
there
is no shell access on those servers.
/Typical use case I:/
While on vacation in the Bahamas, David Williams is committing
from a
hotel lobby. Although David has a full shell, his commits are
unchallenged on dev.eclipse.org. After successfully opening an
SSH shell
on build, he is instantly kicked out and notified via email.
After
replying to the email, his subsequent logins succeed. Weeks
later, back
in the USA, David receives an unexpected notification that his
account
was used successfully from a computer in Spain. He then realizes
he
should not have left his computer unattended while ordering that
last
margarita in the Bahamas, and proceeds to inform webmaster that
his
private key has been compromised.
The would-be hacker in Spain is left with a closed SSH session,
and can
no longer connect to any eclipse.org server.
/
//Typical use case II:/
While at EclipseCon Europe, an elite group of hackers posing as
Obeo
committers proceed to distract the webmaster with endless praise
and
numerous free drinks, and use his laptop. Although none of the
impostors
speak French, the webmaster is unaware that his private key is
now
compromised. The next day, the webmaster awakens to a headache
and email
notifications that usage of his account has been blocked. A
compromise
is avoided, and the impostors frustratingly return empty handed.
*
*We estimate this mechanism will cause very minimal
inconvenience to
you, while offering us excellent protection against private key
and
password theft.
Thanks for reading. If you have any questions or concerns,
please
contact Matt and I at webmaster@xxxxxxxxxxx.
--
*Denis Roy*
EclipseCon Europe 2011
<http://www.eclipsecon.org/europe2011>
--
Denis Roy
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