From: cross-project-issues-dev-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxx [mailto:cross-project-issues-dev-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxx]
On Behalf Of Denis Roy
Sent: Wednesday, September 14, 2011 10:09 AM
To: Cross project issues
Subject: Re: [cross-project-issues-dev] Why allowing Hudson to write to your downloads is a Bad Idea.
On 09/14/2011 10:02 AM, Ed Merks wrote:
I agree with Doug.
At no point have I seen anyone answer this question:
What can be done manually to determine if what's produced by Hudson is compromised or not?
Off the top of my head:
1. run a build on a remote system and compare the pre-signed binaries.
2. run a past build and compare today's binaries with those in the past.
3. run a build and examine the execution trace.
4. run a build, run the executable and examine network output for unknown activity.
I also have to question whether this change during the SR1 shutdown phase is appropriate timing...
Go download the latest Linux Kernel from Kernel.org and tell me if there is ever a more appropriate time than 'now' to discuss security.
On 14/09/2011 6:55 AM, Schaefer, Doug wrote:
I'll come back to something Dave Carver mentioned yesterday. If we don't trust Hudson, then we shouldn't be using it, or at least should be wrapping it up in tighter security, like a VPN for example. If someone is going to do something malicious and they're smart, you're likely not going to be able to discover it. You have to cut it at the source.
And is this not an issue other Hudson/Jenkins users have run into? What are they doing for security. Or do they trust Hudson as much as they do ssh.